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ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS IN LATIN-AMERICAN LAW*
JULIO CUETO-RUA-I
INTRODUCTION
Y1AT provincialism in the Americas still holds sway in the field of
law is apparent, for the common-law lawyer knows little about
Latin-American law, and the Latin-American civil-law lawyer is equally
ignorant of the rules and techniques of the common law. This is an
era concerned with the need for closer relationships and greater mutual
knowledge among all peoples. There are no national boundaries for sci-
entific achievements, artistic developments and technological advance-
ments. In fact, the last decades have shown a growing and fruitful ex-
change between North America and Latin America in the most important
fields of human endeavor: arts, economy, sciences. But the lawyers of
this hemisphere have not contributed a great deal towards the drive of
the swelling tide which seeks to weld together the peoples of the
Americas.
The deplorable lack of information with regard to the law in force
in the western hemisphere is a negative element which has hindered
inter-American communication in the legal field, either because of the
fear of multiple technical difficulties, or because technical terminology
conceals the purely classificatory nature of many of the so-called "differ-
ences" between civil and common law, or beclouds the significance of
the peculiar mental processes applied by the jurists of both systems in
the handling of legal matters. The consequences of this unsatisfactory
situation can be felt in the area of international relations as well as in
the fields of economic and cultural intercourse.
The legal profession is one of the most active factors in shaping
modern society. The range of its influence is wide and pervades the whole
field of social human relations. The judge, the advocate, the counselor,
the jurist, the legislator, all have a vital influence in government, busi-
ness, international relations, community life, and politics. Each contrib-
utes his wisdom, knowledge, and experience to the law-making process
* This article is part of a book the author is writing on the law of contracts in the
Americas, covering mutual assent, causa and consideration, conditions and impossibility
of performance, which will be published by the Southwestern Legal Foundation.
Reference to specific articles in the Latin-American codes will be made thusly: article 1
of the Commercial Code of Argentina cited as Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 1.
' Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University, School of Law. Minister of In-
dustry and Commerce, Argentina.
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which moulds society; to the slow formation of new social mores; and to
the definition and fulfillment of social values.'
Because of its tremendous influence, the legal profession has a great
responsibility to all the citizens of the Americas, irrespective of national
affiliations.
There is no doubt that the neglect of the legal profession of the vari-
ous Latin-American countries with regard to the study of the common
law has been one important factor hampering better relations between
the North and the South. On the other hand, the same criticism can be
addressed to the United States legal profession with regard to the study
of Latin-American law. The United States lawyer would probably be
shocked to know how superficial and vague is the knowledge which a
a Latin-American lawyer has of common law. American legal materials
translated into Spanish are scarce. Furthermore, such translations as
exist are often a source of misunderstandings because of grave termino-
logical problems. Still more significant is the almost entire lack of in-
formation available on the specific common-law technique whereby cases
are decided by the application of prior decisions rendered by courts on
similar facts. Those few Latin-American lawyers who may be interested
in the study of common law can not easily satisfy their wishes, for
American law books are not easy to find south of the Rio Grande, and,
when found, are misunderstood because the essential presuppositions of
the common-law system are unknown to civil-law lawyers.
No less appalling is the lack of knowledge of the United States law-
yer with regard to Latin-American law. They know, perhaps, that the
civil law prevails in most of those communities, but there is little ac-
curate understanding as to its specific content or of the highly developed
methods used in construing codes and other statutory materials. Even
though there are a number of civil-law codes translated into English,'
1. See Brown, Lawyers, Law Schools and the Public Service (1948).
2. The German Civil Code, translated and annotated with an historical introduction
and appendices, by Chung Hui Wang, Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 1907; Code
of Commerce of the Republic of the Philippines, with annotation on the effect of the
new Civil Code, by Vicente J. Francisco, East Pub. Manila, 1950; The Argentine Civil
Code, together with the Constitution and Law of Civil Registry, translated by Frand L.
Joannini, Boston, Boston Book Co., 1917; The Civil Code of Brazil, translation from
the official Portuguese text, by Joseph Wheless, The Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis,
1920; Compendium of the Laws of Mexico, 2d ed. revised and rewritten throughout
by Joseph Wheless, Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis, 1938; Petit Code Civil Annot6 de
la Province de Quebec, by Louis-Joseph de la Durantage, Wilson et Bailer, Montreal,
1950, transcribing also the official English version; Code of the Philippines, Manila, Bu-
reau of Printing, 1949; the huge collection edited under the direction of Sir Thomas
Edward Scrutton and William Bowstead, The Commercial Laws of the World, The Boston
Book Co., Boston, even though obsolete, still is useful for the common-law lawyer inter-
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they are not, generally speaking, the subject of study or inquiry by the
American lawyer.3
The perusal of any civil-law code, per se, will not be very enlighten-
ing to the common-law lawyer, for its very broad and abstract principles
are ambiguous to him, and will not give clear and definite answers to
the specific problem he may have in mind. It is similar, in a sense, to the
effect of the Restatements of the Law on a civil-law lawyer, who, when he
reads them without adequate knowledge of their case-law background,
does not understand them. The correct construction of the Restatemaits
demands a knowledge of the cases from which the broad generalizations
have been drawn, for there is an intimate relationship between the Restate-
-ments and the precedents which constitute common law. The situation
offers a certain parallelism with regard to a civil-law code. Its proper
understanding requires a command of basic civil-law doctrine, that is to
say, of the theoretical contributions of the great jurists which paved
the way for codification, and who have developed the subject matter
through their treatises and analyses. Civil-law doctrine is a living and
essential part of the civil-law codes, and without fair knowledge of the
first, the second is a highly complex and abstract set of legal provisions
whose meaning is difficult to grasp.
The fact that Latin-American legal science ignores the achievements
of the common-law theorists, and legal scholarship in the United States
ignores the achievements of the civil law, dangerously isolates the two
great theoretical efforts of this hemisphere.
The picture is not completely gloomy, however, for here and there can
be found encouraging indications of a change. The organized bar has
sought closer relationships among the members of the legal profession
throughout the Americas by the creation of the Inter-American Bar
Association in 1941.4 The Academnia Interamericana de Derecho Con-
ested in obtaining information about civil-law techniques. This collection publishes the
most important commercial codes of the civil-law area with an English translation. The
Civil Law in Spain and Spanish-America, including Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Philippine
Islands and the Spanish Civil Code, by Clifford Stevens Walton, Washington, D.C. W. H.
Lowdermilk & Co, 1900; Translation of the Civil Code in Force in Cuba, published by
the Division of Customs and Insular Affairs of the War Department, Washington, Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1S99; Civil Code of Peru, translated by Frank L. Joannini, St. Louis,
Thomas Law Book Co., 1920.
3. The exception appears to be the Louisiana law'er, because of the strong civil-law
influence in the shaping of Louisiana's private law.
4. See Inter-American Bar Association, Proceedings of the First Conference (1941);
1-6 Federaao Interamericana de Abogados Anais da Segunda Conferencia (1943); 1-3
Federad6n Interamericana de Abogados, Mlemora de la Tercera Conferenda (1945);
Federad6n Interamericana de Abogados, Qinta Conferencia (1947); Inter-American Bar
Association, Proceedings of the Sixth Conference (1949); Inter-American Bar A--ociation,
Proceedings of the Ninth Conference (1956).
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parado e Internacional in Havana, has undertaken a vigorous campaign
to promote inter-American legal studies, drawing to Cuba jurists, prac-
titioners and law students from both the civil-law and the common-law
areas for intensive studies in the fields of private and public law.5 In the
United States there is a growing interest in the field demonstrated by the
excellent work of the Inter-American Law Institute at New York Uni-
versity,0 the Law Institute of the Americas at Southern Methodist Uni-
versity,7 and the solid support of the Ford Foundation for inter-Ameri-
can legal studies. More and more schools are including comparative
law courses in their curriculums and the pioneering efforts of Tulane
University, the University of Michigan, and Harvard University, have
set the pace for an intensified drive to establish a bridge linking the
jurists of both systems.
Against this background of contemporary activity a survey of the
Latin-American law of contracts would not appear to be amiss, the
more so if some of the techniques and devices furnished by the com-
5. See 1-4 Academia Interamericana de Derecho Comparado e Internacional, Cursos
Monogrificos (1948-54); 1-2 Academia Interamericana de Derecho Comparado c Inter-
nacional, Debates de Mesa Redonda (1947-51).
6. Eder, A Comparative Survey of Anglo-American and Latin-American Law (1950).
7. The Law Institute of the Americas has sponsored a series of studies in this area
of inter-American legal studies among which are the following: El Common Law Anfillsis
de un problema interpretativo concreto, Revista Juridica Argentina La Ley [hereinafter
La Ley] (Feb. 1957); El Common Law, La explicitacion de la norma general involucrada
en la Sentencia precedente, La Ley (Feb. 1957); El Common Law, Modernas tendenclas,
La Ley (Dec. 1956); El Common Law, Stare decisis, La Ley (Dec. 1956); Cueto-Rua,
El Common Law, Teoria tradicional. Su Critica. Nuevas Perspectivas, La Ley (Nov.
1956); Cueto-Rua and Harding, La ensefianza del Derecho Comerdial Comparado, La Ley
(March 1955); Singer, El Seguro Social de desocupacion en los Estados Unidos, La Ley
(April 1955); La Compensaci6n de los accidentes del trabajo en el Common Law, La Ley
(Jan. 1954); Fernando Barrancos y Vedia, Observaciones sobre el Regimen Jurldico
del Mandato, La Ley (March 1954); Modernas Tendencias pedag6gicas en las Escuelas de
Derecho norteamericanas, La Ley (Nov. 1953); El Case Method, La Ley (Aug. 1953);
Fernando Barrancos y Vedia, Contracts Between a Corporation and its Directors, 5 Am.
J. Comp. L. 497 (1956); Cueto-Rua and Harding, Teaching Comparative Commer-
cial Law, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 40 (1955); Cueto-Rua and Cesar Ramos, Conceptos bfisicos
sobre el regimen juridico de las llamadas condiciones en el Derecho norteamericano do los
Contratos y observaciones Comparativas en relaci6n a los Derechos argentinos y mexicano,
44 Revista de Derecho y Legislaci6n, Caracas, Venezuela 270 (1955); La indemnlzacl6n
por accidentes del trabajo en el Derecho legislado de los Estados Unidos de America, 15
Derecho de Trabajo (Argentina) 321 (1955); Thomas and Thomas, Igualdad de los Es-
tados en el Derecho Internacional. Realidad Ficci6n? 31 Revista del Colegio de Abo-
gados de Buenos Aires 185 (1953); Cueto-Rua, El "Law Institute of the Americas," 4
Revista Juridica del Peru 152 (1953); Cueto-Rua, El Common Law. Su Estructura Nor-
mativa (1957); Thomas and Thomas, Non Intervention, The Law and its Import in the
Americas (1956); Thomas, Communism v. International Law (1953).
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parative method are employed as an aid to span the gulf that has part-
ed the two legal systems of this hemisphere.
SOURCES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS IN LATIN AiERICA
The common-law lawyer, seeking an answer to a legal problem, looks
for analogies in recorded past judicial experience. His main normative
source is to be found in that collection of reported cases which offer a
certain degree of similarity with the fact situation at hand. The common-
law lawyer predicts the probable outcome of the case on the basis of
prior decisions by judges of the same jurisdiction in similar past cases.
The closer the analogy, the better the likelihood that the case will fol-
low the path of precedent cases, for, in general, the rule of stare decisis
will govern. The source of the law is the precedent in point. This search
for precedents does not require the use of a high degree of abstract
logic but, rather, demands versatile ability to appreciate and evaluate
past fact situations and to find the appropriate general rule of law from
a concrete judicial decision rendered in a similar case.
This is not the manner in which a Latin-American lawyer approaches
his problem. In the first place, theoretically, there is no principle of
stare decisis. The judges are bound by the abstract provisions of the
civil code, the statutes, the decrees of the executive power, or by ad-
ministrative regulations, but not by the decisions of other judges ren-
dered in similar cases. The authority of precedent in the civil law is,
in general, only persuasive." No judge is obliged to render a decision
S. The situation offers a somewhat different feature in those countries where "casach5n"
has been established, i.e., Venezuela, C6digo de Procedimiento Civil, arts. 413-45; Colombia,
C6digo Judicial, arts. 519-41; Chile, C6digo de Procedimiento Civil, arts. 764-019; Costa
Rica, C6digo de Procedimientos Civiles, arts. 902-32; Cuba, Ley de Enjuicianiento Civil
libro 2, titulo 21; Dominican Republic, Ley Sabre Procedimiento de Casaci6n; Guate-
mala, Codigo de Enjuiciamiento Civil y Mercantil, arts. 505-25; Haiti, Loi No. S sur la
cassation des jugements en matire civile et en matire de commerce; and Loi organique
du Tribunal de Cassation du 16 mars 1923; Honduras, C6digo de Procedimientos, arts.
899-960; Nicaragua, ley del 2 de Julio de 1912. The recurso de casac,u is a -p-cal
type of appeal whose scope varies from country to country, but which has a feature which
makes it similar in certain aspects to the binding force of judicial precedents at the
common law. It is generally accepted that the doctrine of the Court of Ca-sation ought
to be followed by the lower courts. In civil-law countries this implies that the meaning
attributed by the Court of Cassation to the words employed by the legislator in the stat-
utes under consideration have to be accepted by the lower courts. Paraphrasing Dean
Levi's statements (An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 23 (1957)), we may say that once
a decisive interpretation of the code or statute has been made by the Court of Caszation
and a direction has been fixed within the gap of ambiguity, lower courts ought to follow
the indicated direction. In this sense, the Court of Cassation's interpretation of legislation
is not dictum. The words it uses do more than decide the case. They give broad direc-
tion to the code or statute.
It is important to point out that the decision of a Court of Cassation in construing the
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based on preceding cases whatever the similarity of fact situations may
be. Even though the judge is not bound to follow precedent, the fact
is that judges, in actuality, do follow precedent in most of the instances
as a matter of course.
A civil-law lawyer faced with a contractual problem must answer sev-
eral questions before undertaking a thorough study of the matter at
hand. The first question is related to the nature of the contract. Is it a
civil contract, a commercial contract, or an administrative contract?
The common-law lawyer generally is not much concerned about such
classifications, for there are no essential differences at common law
among administrative, commercial (business), or purely civil contracts.
The general theory of contracts applies to all types, without making any
important distinction, and this includes contracts entered into by the
government or its agencies with private persons. But in civil law the
first step to be taken in dealing with a contract question is the deter-
mination of its category (administrative, civil, or commercial), for each
classification is governed by different rules of evidence and procedure,
has different statutes of limitation, and the parties thereto have different
rights and obligations.
A. Administrative Contracts
In civil law it is difficult to draw up an acceptable definition of an
administrative contract which would satisfy all civil-law jurists. The
situation is further complicated by the fact that administrative law has
not been codified. This has proved to be a drawback for the civil-law
lawyer, who usually feels himself on safer ground when dealing with
codified matters.
There are, nevertheless, certain features which are essential elements
of an administrative contract. The first is that one of the parties to the
meaning of an article of a code or of a statute offers a kind of abstract flavor to which
the common-law lawyer is not accustomed in his dealings with case-law materials. The
decision of the Court of Cassation will state the meaning of certain words of the article
of the code, by using other words which are also an expression of abstract concepts. The
logical extension of the article of the code will be diminished to some extent, but not
sufficiently to make the construed article concrete and unambiguous in its relationship to
social reality. When a civil-law lawyer studies and analyses a decision of the Court of
Cassation he is not obliged to concentrate his attention on the facts of the case in order to
determine what is material and what is immaterial, in order to ascertain the proper scope
of the decision. His problem is to determine what is the conceptual extension of the
words employed by the court in its definition of the meaning of the words of the code
or the statute. Those abstract but definitive words, employed by the Court of Cassation
in its description of the meaning of the words of the code or the statute, have, In fact,
a binding force with regard to lower courts.
[Vol. 26
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transaction must be the government or an agency of the government,"
that is to say, an entity of public law,10 such as the federal government,
the provincial government, municipalities, and their branches. The sec-
ond requirement is that the promise to be performed must be in the
nature of a public service.'1 Typical cases of administrative contracts
include the following: an agreement whereby a person in return for
payment promises to undertake the construction of a public work; an
agreement whereby the state leases public lands, or whereby the right is
granted to a person to operate a public utility; a contract whereby an
employee agrees to perform services at the offices of the government;
the sale of goods or merchandise to the government when these are
necessary to carry on a public service; the underwriting of issues of
government bonds or papers of a similar nature; and the concession of
property or equipment owned by the state to persons who are engaged
in the performance of a public service. All of these contracts are regu-
lated by administrative law, and the provisions of the civil codes are only
applied in a subsidiary manner. Thus the question of capacity becomes
one of jurisdiction; the question of causa becomes one of public inter-
est; the question of enforcement becomes one of administrative pro-
cedure.
These basic differences make the distinction between administrative
contracts and private (civil or commercial) contracts a major one. To
this effect two tests are usually applied. The first test has been devel-
oped by French doctrine, and it is known as the public service test, for
it takes into account the nature of the promise to be performed.' If the
promise is related to services which are provided by the state to satisfy
general social needs,' 3 then the contract can be classified as an admin-
istrative contract. This test is difficult to apply because the concept of
public service is, in itself, vague and obscure. For example, there is no
question as to the public interest which derives from the operation of a
railroad. The contract whereby the state authorizes a person or cor-
poration to own a railroad is an administrative contract. But suppose
9. It is important to recall that the government or its agencies may be engaged in
activities of a purely private nature, as, for instance, in the operation of a bant, or in
the production and distribution of merchandise. Contracts entered into by the government
while engaged in private transactions are regulated by the civil or commercial codes, as
the case may be.
10. Bielsa, Principios de Derecho Administrativo 107 (1943).
11. Cavalcanti, Tratado de Direito Administrativo 359 (1943), says that there are con-
tracts called admnistrative contracts because of the parties who made them and the
public interest surrounding the performance of the promises made by the parties.
12. Hauriou, Precis de Droit Administratif et de Droit Public GUnural 67-70 (9th ed.
1919).
13. Appleton, Trait Elementaire du Contentieux Administratif 114 (1927).
1957]
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that the state itself owns and operates a railroad, and in connection
therewith enters into an agreement with a coal miner to purchase coal.
Such a contract is not an administrative contract, because in this in-
stance the state is not acting as a public entity but rather as a private
person. It is generally agreed that the procurement of fuel under these
circumstances is subject to the provisions of the civil or commercial code,
as the case may be, and not to administrative law. To rationalize this
conclusion, it is declared that a contract does not fall within the admin-
istrative category when the services for whose operation the materials
are acquired are performed in competition with services offered by pri-
vate persons. 14
The second test applied to administrative contracts takes into account
the nature of the character which the administration assumes in the
instant case. This test is related to one of the most important doctrines
of continental administrative law, i.e., the double legal personality of the
state. In accordance with this widely accepted doctrine, the state may
in certain cases clothe itself with the same rights and duties of a pri-
vate person. In such cases, its activities are regulated by private law;
hence, the contracts it makes in such a capacity are to be regulated by
the civil or commercial code, as the case may be. In other instances, the
government or its agencies act as a public entity, a person of public law
(persona de derecho piblico) whose acts are regulated by constitutional
and administrative law.
In these latter situations, the government occupies a position of privi-
lege or priority with regard to any person who enters into contractual
relations with it. This test requires a careful analysis as to the position
of the government in its dealings with third parties, the scope and mean-
ing of the statutes and regulations which have authorized the specific
type of activity concerned, and the nature of its powers with regard
to third parties.
B. Civil and Commercial Contracts
Another basic distinction in civil law, and, more specifically in Latin-
American civil law, is the distinction between civib and commercial con-
tracts. Each of the twenty Latin-American republics differentiates be-
tween the two types of contracts in its law, and the distinction is an
important one, not only because different rules of substantive law apply
for commercial and civil contracts, but also because it relates to some
important jurisdictional and procedural matters 5
14. Bielsa, op. cit. supra note 10, at 108.
15. Pineda Leon, Principios de Derecho Mercantil 49 (1952), lists the following con-
sequences: (a) special procedural rules; (b) different types of evidence; (c) rates of in-
[Vol. 26
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The evidence required to prove a commercial case may not be the
same as the evidence required to prove a civil case. Each Latin-Ameri-
can commercial code has a set of provisions describing the formalities
of the various types of books of accounting which the merchants are
required to keep, and the various means whereby commercial transac-
tions can be-proved. 16 The codes of commerce not only regulate the
specific way in which these books must be kept, but also state their
value as evidence either as against the merchant who keeps them, or
against other merchants, or against any other person who is not a merchant
but who happens to be engaged in a legal controversy with a merchant. IT
terest; (d) qualification of the person who performs such acts with regularity; (e) lia-
bility for breach of contract. Olavarria Avila, Manual de Darecho Comercdal (1950), adds
to this list the value of customary usage as source of law and special taxation privileges
or immunities.
16. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 208-11, 43-67; Bolivia, Cod. Com. arts. 211-13, 32-64;
Brazil, Cod. Com. arts. 10-16, 122-25; Chile, Cod. Com. arts. 25-46, 127-29; Colombia,
Cod. Com. arts. 27-54; Costa Rica, ley del 5 de Julio de 101, arts. 1-13, 16-19; Cuba,
Cod. Com. arts. 33-49, 51-52; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com. arts. 8-11, 109; Ecuador,
Cod. Com. arts. 35-48, 54-59, 164-6S; El Salvador, Cod. Com. arts. 13-30; Guatemala,
Cod. Com. arts. 16-41, 50-59, 21S-23; Haiti, Cod. Com. arts. 9-12; Honduras, Cod. Com.
arts. 33-41, 47-49, 78-79; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. arts. 2842, 111-17; Panama, Cod. Com.
arts. 71-88, 45-200; Paraguay, Cod. Com. arts. 203-11, 43-67; Peru, Cod. Com. arts. 33-44,
51-52; Uruguay, Cod. Com. arts. 54-67, 192-95; Venezuela, Cod. Com. arts. 32-37, 124,
126-28.
17. Typical of this type of provision are arts. 63-65 of the Codes of Commerce of
Argentina and Paraguay which state that the entries in the books of accounting in com-
mercial transactions are conclusive evidence against the merchant who carries them; that
those entries can be invoked as evidence against another merchant, if the latter does not
show entries to the contrary in his own books of accounting carried as indicated by law
or does not produce convincing and satisfactory evidence to the contrary; that if a
party offers as evidence the entries in the books of accounting of the counterpart mer-
chant, he is bound to admit the relevancy of all the entries combined which have any
bearing on the matter under discussion, and is prevented from sAeecting those which are
convenient to his cause, rejecting the others. If the transaction is not commercial then the
books of accounting will not serve as sufficient evidence, but may be introduced as partial
evidence which requires other proof as corroboration. The Code of Commerce of Chile
has provisions of a similar nature: if merchant B's books of accounting have been altered,
or show blanks, or erasures, or lack of continuity in their pages, they will not have value
as evidence for the merchant B who carried them; furthermore if the other party, A, is
also a merchant, who has carried his own books of accounting in the manner required
by law, then A's books of accounting will be sufficient evidence against B unless B can
produce a preponderance of evidence against the merchant who carries them (art. 38);
and if one party, A, states that he will accept as sufficient evidence whatever entries have
been made by the other party, B, in B's books of accounting and B refuses to show his
books, then A will be allowed to prove by oath acts, the evidence of which he wanted to
introduce (art. 37). Article 48 of the Code of Commerce of Peru carefully regulates the
respective value as evidence which books of accounting have for merchants vho are par-
ties to a law suit, following, in general, the provisions of the Argentine Code. The Vene-
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There are certain rules which are applicable to commercial contracts
only, either with regard to the availability of parol evidence, or with
regard to the formalities which must be met in the making of contracts.
The Latin-American codes of commerce have established regulations for
a series of professional activities which are intimately related to trade.
These regulations not only define the respective duties and rights of the
parties to the transaction,' but also include provisions with regard to
the formalities to be fulfilled by the parties, and the type of evidence
available to the parties. Thus, for instance, the activities of brokers,19
auctioneers,20  owners of depots and warehouses,2  and carriers2 must
zuelan Code of Commerce provides (art. 38) that the books of accounting which have
been carried in accordance with the requirements of the Code can be used as evidence
between merchants with regard to business transactions. If the other party is not a mer-
chant, then the books of accounting can be used as evidence only against the merchant
who carries them, but in this instance whoever invokes the books of accounting as evi-
dence is bound to accept the validity, as evidence, of those entries which are favorable
to his interests, as well as those which are not. Similar provisions can be found in
almost every Latin-American code of commerce.
18. The provisions defining the rights and duties of the parties to the contract are
usually of a supplementary nature, i.e., they will be applied if the parties to the transac-
tion have been silent as to their intent with reference to the specific point raised. In other
instances, however, certain provisions will have a mandatory character, and the parties
cannot set them aside by virtue of the agreement.
19. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 88-112; Bolivia, Cod. Com. arts. 66-106; Brazil, Cod.
Com. arts. 36-67; Chile, Cod. Com. arts. 48-80; Colombia, Cod. Com. arts. 65-91; Cuba,
Cod. Com. arts. 88-115; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com. arts. 74-90; Ecuador, Cod. Com.
arts. 70-99; El Salvador, Cod. Com. arts. 39-60; Guatemala, Cod. Com. arts. 72-201;
Haiti, Cod. Com. arts. 44-89; Honduras, Cod. Com. arts. 827-41; Mexico, Reglamento de
corredores para la Plaza de Mexico, November 1, 1891; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. arts. 49-70;
Panama, Cod. Com. arts. 107-27; Paraguay, Cod. Com. arts. 88-112; Peru, Cod. Com.
arts. 88-115; Uruguay, Cod. Com. arts. 89-113; Venezuela, Cod. Com. arts. 66-81.
20. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 113-22; Brazil, Cod. Com. arts. 68-73; Chile, Cod.
Com. arts. 81-95; Colombia, Cod. Com. arts. 106-20; Ecuador, Cod. Com. arts, 100-12;
El Salvador, Cod. Com. arts. 61-72; Guatemala, Cod. Com. arts. 202-14; Nicaragua, Cod.
Com. arts. 71-79; Panama, Cod. Com. arts. 128-39; Paraguay, Cod. Com. arts. 113-22;
Peru, Cod. Com. arts. 116-23; Uruguay, Cod. Com. arts. 114-23; Venezuela, Cod. Com.
arts. 82-93.
21. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 123-31; Brazil, Cod. Com. arts. 87-98; Chile, statutes
No. 389 and 5069 and Reglamento de ley de Almacenes Generales de Dep6sito; Cuba,
Cod. Com. arts. 303-10; Guatemala, Cod. Com. arts. 469-76; Honduras, Cod. Com. arts.
842-73; Mexico, Ley General de Titulos y Operaciones de Cr6ditos, arts. 280-87; Nica-
ragua, Cod. Com. arts. 460-85; Panama, Cod. Com. arts. 168-91; Paraguay, Cod. Com.
arts. 123-31; Peru, Cod. Com. arts. 297-304; Uruguay, Cod. Com. arts. 124-32.
22. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 162-206; Bolivia, Cod. Com. arts. 174-95; Brazil, Cod.
Com. arts. 99-118; Chile, Cod. Com. arts. 166-232; Colombia, Cod. Com. arts. 258-330;
Costa Rica, Ley del 29 de Noviembre de 1920; Cuba, Cod. Com. arts. 349-79; Dominican
Republic, Cod. Com. arts. 102-08; Ecuador, Cod. Com. arts. 204-60; El Salvador, Cod.
Com. arts. 99-121; Guatemala, Cod. Com. arts. 138-71; Haiti, Cod. Com. arts. 95-106;
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be analyzed from a legal standpoint by taking into account the specific
provisions of the codes of commerce regulating their professional activi-
ties.
How can one distinguish a commercial contract from a civil contract?
There is no universal criterion of classification, and among the various
Latin-American countries there are important differences to be taken
into account. The consideration of each particular contract requires a
close study of the local law under which the contract was entered into.
There are two different tests to determine whether a contract falls
within the category of commercial or civil. The first test is objective,
and the second, subjective. Most of the codes of commerce of the Latin-
American republics combine both tests, although the objective test pre-
dominates. From a historical standpoint the subjective test was the
first to be applied. Even the French Ordinance of 1763, where the objec-
tive criterion appeared for the first time,2-3 declared that business trans-
actions (actes de commerce, actos de comercio), were those conducted
by merchants. Merchants were defined as members of the merchant
guild. When the French guilds were eliminated by the Edict of Turgot,
in 1776, the necessity of defining business transactions in accordance
with some other test became acute. The French then established the doc-
trine of the objective act of commerce which concluded that the pur-
chase of goods for resale was a commercial transaction in itself, regard-
less of the profession or calling of the buyer. -"
In accordance with this idea, Lyon-Caen and Renault declared that
there are acts of commerce which are commercial in themselves, i.e.,
independent of the profession of whoever undertook them, while other
acts are deemed to be commercial solely because they were undertaken
or performed by merchants,", The first type are usually called objec-
tive acts of commerce and the second, subjective acts of commerce. -0
Honduras, Cod. Com. arts. 1070-1104; Mexico, Cod. Com. arts. 516-604; Nicaragua, Cod.
Com. arts. 369-S9; Panama, Cod. Com. arts. 663-727; Paraguay, Cod. Com. arts. 162-206;
Uruguay, Cod. Com. arts. 163-89.
23. Olavarria Avila, op. ciL supra note 15, at ISO.
24. See citation of Vincens, Pradier-Fodere and Colvafru, by Siburu, Comentario
del Codigo de Comercio Argentino 69 (3d ed. 1933).
25. Lyon-Caen and Renault, Manuel de Droit Commercial 29 (1924).
26. See 1 Vivante, Trattato di Diritto Commerciale 97 (3d ed. 1S96). Some Italian
and German writers have criticized not only the distinction made in the text, but also
the distinction between commercial transactions (acts of commerce) and civil transactions.
The most important exponent of this doctrine, probably, is Ercole Vidari, Corso di
Diritto Commerciale 25-48 (5th ed. 1900). The teachings of Vidari have not be.n
followed in Latin America. All Latin-American nations make the distinction between
civil and commercial contracts an essential one.
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It is apparent that the first concept of the French doctrine, i.e., that
the commercial transaction comprised the purchase of goods for re-
sale, was limited in its scope and that some new concept had to be
developed in order to cover all the manifold activities of modern trade
and commerce. Many attempts have been made to isolate a certain ele-
ment or feature of an act which would thereby make it commercial.
All such attempts have failed because the various elements which have
been selected by the jurists have not been sufficient to cover the wide
range of commercial transactions.17  In general, those doctrines have
hinged upon the ideas of mediation between producer and consumer,
profit and speculation. Acts of commerce, it is said, are either those
which promote or facilitate the circulation of wealth or those which are
performed for profit or speculation.2 It is apparent that neither of these
two ideas, nor a combination of both, is sufficient to furnish adequate
coverage for the various types of transactions which have been regu-
lated by the codes of commerce. The prevailing continental doctrine
has come to the conclusion that there is no single element nor essential
concept whose presence will make a transaction a commercial one and
nothing else.29 Lyon-Caen and Renault have stated that, in fact, no such
common essential element exists.30 This obvious conclusion has led to
the only possible answer, that is to say, that the commercial nature of
the act has to be determined by taking into account the specific defini-
tions and classifications set forth in the code of commerce of each na-
tion.31 Since a precise and detailed description of all the acts of com-
merce under the Latin-American codes is beyond the scope of this study,
only a description of the most important of these transactions which are
considered to be commercial, regardless of the person who undertook
them, performed the services, or entered into the agreement, will be
given.
27. This is not the place to analyze and discuss these theories. An excellent exposition
thereof is Thaller, Trait6 Elmentaire de Droit Commercial (4th ed. 1900). An original
contribution which has raised considerable interest is Rocco, Saggio di una teorla generale
degli atti di commercio, 1 Rivista di Diritto Commerciale [hereinafter R.D. Co.] 81
(1916).
28. Siburu, op. cit. supra note 24, at 70; Lyon-Caen and Renault, op. cit. supra
note 25, at 29.
29. See Rocco, op. cit. supra note 27, at 92; Mezzera Alvarez, Curso de Derecho
Comercial 51 (2d ed. 1951).
30. Lyon-Caen and Renault, op. cit. supra note 25, at 29.
31. 1 Vivante, op. cit. supra note 26, at 97 says that the commercial nature of a trans-
action is derived from the mandatory declaration of the law. The same approach In Lyon-
Caen and Renault, op. cit. supra note 25, at 30; and Mezzera Alvarez, op. cit. supra note
29, at 57.
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1. Objective Acts of Commerce
The Latin-American codes have followed two different procedures in
defining or describing the acts or situations considered to be commer-
cial per se, i.e., objective acts of commerce. One has been to list those
acts in a descriptive, though usually not exclusive, manner. This tech-
nique, for instance, has been followed by the Codes of Argentina, Para-
guay, Uruguay, Haiti, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Dominican Republic,
Venezuela, Panama, Guatemala, and Ecuador. The other technique has
been to set forth in a general statement what is, from an objective stand-
point, an act of commerce and/or to establish regulations in the various
chapters of the code for what are considered to be the typical cases of
commercial transactions, leaving it up to the jurists, judges and com-
mentators to define the common genus of all these transactions, if any can
be ascertained. Thus the Code of Commerce of Honduras, article 3,
defines acts of commerce as those whose finality is the operation, the
convergence, or the winding up of an enterprise and other acts of an
analogous character, unless they are essentially civil in their nature.
The message which accompanied the draft of the Code when it was
submitted for its approval to the Honduran National Congress elab-
orated on the above mentioned definition in the following terms: "It is
the opinion of the Executive Power that the distinguishing feature of
these acts (the acts of commerce) is to be found in the fact that com-
mercial transportation, commercial insurance and commercial sale imply
the execution of thousands of similar acts, showing identical legal and
economic characteristics. These are acts which are performed as a series
of acts en masse. Because they are performed by the thousands (en
,masa) they demand specific legal regulations, simple in their nature,
where good faith and legal security may be attained; where the mani-
festation of the will of the parties may be adjusted to forms in which
the personality of the contracting party loses influence and significance.
On the other hand, those acts performed as a series of acts by the
thousands (en masa) demand the presence of an adequate professional
organization: insurance is unthinkable without an insurance enterprise,
or transportation without a transportation enterprise, or storage without
the warehouse company, or banking operations without the presence of
the bank, or sales without an enterprise which is professionally devoted
to sell to the public. Who perchance buys for resale, who perchance
transports for a price, who occasionally receives merchandise for stor-
age, who occasionally offers credit, who performs an act of a nature
traditionally considered commercial, but does it not as an instance of
his professional activity or of his enterprise, does not need special legis-
19571
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lation."' 2 As it can be easily seen, the test applied by the Honduran
Code closely approaches the subjective test, because the commercial na-
ture of the act derives not so much from its intrinsic structure as it does
from the relationship it keeps with other acts of the same nature per-
formed by an entrepreneur.
Article 2 of the Commercial Code of Peru takes a position that the
simpler acts of commerce are those subject to the regulation of the
Commercial Code including those which are analogous to the ones so
regulated. The Commercial Code of Nicaragua follows a system which
offers certain similarity with the system set forth in the Code of Com-
merce of Honduras, i.e., article 82 considers as acts of commerce all the
acts and obligations related to the Code, and the transactions mentioned
by article 20 of the same Code. Article 20 declares merchants to be the
persons who own stores, shops, bars, hotels, restaurants, coffee shops,
factories, printing companies, bookstores, publishing houses, carriers,
van lines, storehouses, insurance companies, agencies, brokerage houses,
etc., i.e., in general, those persons who perform acts regulated by the
Code of Commerce. Again, in this case, it can be seen that a combina-
tion of the subjective and objective test appears to have taken place.
The same can be said of the Code of Commerce of Ecuador, article 3
of which describes acts of commerce by referring to the nature of the
act, but article 140 provides that a contract is a commercial contract
if it has been entered into with a duly registered merchant.
It is possible to undertake a general description of the acts and trans-
actions which most of the Latin-American codes usually consider com-
mercial, but the reader should keep in mind four caveats. First, that
many times the act described by the code as being a commercial act
will require in addition that it be performed with the intent of making
a profit and/or that it is an integral link in the chain of acts which
bring the goods from production to consumption. Second, that the
definition may refer not only to acts, but also to business organizations,
or to certain typical situations which are deemed to be commercial in
their very nature, for example, the transactions, undertakings, and ac-
tivities related to maritime transportation.83 Third, that contracts, trans-
32. Exposicion de Motivos del Proyecto de C6digo de Comercio presentado al Soberano
Congreso Nacional por el Ministro de Hacienda, Credito Pdblico y Comercio, Dr. Urbano
Quesada, Segunda Explicaci6n, para. a.
33. See Fernandez, Codigo de Comercio de ]a Replblica Argentina Comentado 54
(1951). Alberto Zuleta Angel, in his Conferencias de Derecho Mercantil, has made some
accurate remarks, which, even though primarily related to Colombian commercial law,
fairly represent the general tendency of the Latin-American commercial codes. He says
that art. 20 of the Code of Commerce of Colombia enumerates three different types of
situations or acts: (a) commercial contracts, (b) enterprises, and (c) formal acts of com-
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actions, and acts performed gratuitously will not be considered commer-
cial. Finally, that acts analogous in their nature to the acts which have
been specifically considered commercial, usually will also be considered
commercial.
The following is a list of the most common acts, transactions, con-
tracts, associations, and situations which are considered to be commer-
cial by the Latin-American codes. This list is not all-inclusive but is
limited rather to those generally considered commerical by most of the
Latin-American countries: (1) the purchase of movables with the in-
tent of reselling them for profit, either in the same condition they had
when they were purchased or after having altered or changed their shape
or condition,34 (2) banking transactions, 35 (3) stock exchange transac-
tions,36 (4) brokerage, commercial agency and/or commission,37 (5) ne-
gotiation of instruments to the bearer or to order,13 (6) commercial de-
merce (such as the negotiation of an instrument to bearer or to order), ie., acts which
are considered commercial merely on the basis of their form. See the citation of ZulWeta
Angel by Jorge Ortega Torres, C6digo de Comerdo Terrestre, de Colombia, 25 (1953).
34. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. S; Bolivia, Cod. Com. art. 303; Brazil, Cod. Com. art.
191; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 3; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20; Costa Rica, Cod. Com. art.
306; Cuba, Cod. Com. art. 325; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com. arts. 109, 632; Ecuador,
Cod. Com. art. 3; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 3; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 1; Haiti,
Cod. Com. art. 2; Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 763; Mexico, Cod. Com. art. 75; Nicaragua,
Cod. Com. art. 341; Panama, Cod. Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Peru, Cod.
Com. art. 320; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 7; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 2.
35. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 3; Brazil, Cod. Com. art. 120; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 3;
Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20; Costa Rica, statute of April 25, 1900; Cuba, Cod. Com.
arts. 199-217, 177-33; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com. art. 632; Ecuador, Cod. Com.
art. 3; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 3; Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 2; Honduras, Cod. Com.
arts. 875-1069; Mexico, Cod. Com. art. 75; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. art. 20; Paraguay,
Cod. Com. art. 8; Peru, Cod. Com. arts. 134, 203, 563; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 7; Vene-
zuela, Cod. Com. art. 2.
36. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 8; Brazil, Cod. Com. art. 221; Chile, Cod. Com. arL 3;
Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20; Cuba, Cod. Com. arts. 64-$0; Dominican Republic, Cod.
Com. arts. 71, 632; Ecuador, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 60; El Salvador, Cod. Corn. art. 3; Gua-
temala, Cod. Com. art. 596; Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 2; Mexico, Cod. Com. art. 75; Panama,
Cod. Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Peru, Cod. Com. art. 67; Uruguay, Cod.
Com. art. 7; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 2.
37. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 37; Bolivia, Cod. Com. arts. 107-43; Brazil, Cod.
Com. arts. 35-67, 140-90; Chile, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 4S-SO; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20;
Costa Rica, Cod. Com. arts. 62-119; Cuba, Cod. Com. arts. 83-111, 244-E0; Dominican
Republic, Cod. Com. arts. 74-90, 94, 632; Ecuador, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 70, 122; El Sal-
vador, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 39; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 1; Haiti, Cod. Com. arts. 2,
96; Honduras, Cod. Com. arts. 372, S04, 827; Mlexico, Cod. Com. art. 75; Nicaragua,
Cod. Com. arts. 20, 49, 39S; Panama, Cod. Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Peru,
Cod. Com. arts. SS, 237; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 7; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 2.
33. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 87; Bolivia, Cod. Com. arts. 349-459; Brazil, Ley
2044; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 3; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20; Costa Rica, Ley of Novem-
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
posit and warehousing,"0 (7) transportation, 40 (8) maritime transporta-
tion," (9) business associations (incorporated or unincorporated), 42
(10) the activities of managers, bookkeepers and other employees of
merchants, in so far as they relate to the trade of the principal 4  and
ber 25, 1902; Cuba, Cod. Com. arts. 443-556; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com. arts. 110-89,
632; Ecuador, Cod. Com. Titulos VIII, IX; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 3; Guatemala,
Cod. Com. art. 1; Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 2; Honduras, Cod. Com. arts. 458-504; Mexico,
Cod. Com. art. 75; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. arts. 600-76; Panama, Cod. Com. art. 2; Para-
guay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Peru, Cod. Com. arts. 67, 434-556; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 7;
Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 2.
39. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 8, 87; Bolivia, Cod. Com. art. 342; Brazil, Cod. Com.
arts. 87, 98, 280; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 3; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20; Costa Rica, Cod.
Com. art. 351; Cuba, Cod. Com. arts. 8, 10, 193, 303; Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 528;
El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 3; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 469; Honduras, Cod. Com.
art. 842; Mexico, Ley General de Instituciones de Cr~dito, art. 75; Nicaragua, Cod. Com.
arts. 20, 460; Panama, Cod. Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Peru, Cod. Com.
arts. 197, 279; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 721; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 512.
40. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 8, 87; Bolivia, Cod. Com. arts. 107-48; Brazil, Cod.
Com. arts. 35-67, 140-90; Chile, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 48, 80; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20;
Costa Rica, Cod. Com. arts. 62-119; Cuba, Cod. Com. arts. 88-111, 244-80; Dominican
Republic, Cod. Com. art. 632; Ecuador, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 70, 122; El Salvador, Cod.
Com. arts. 3, 39; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 1; Haiti, Cod. Com. arts. 2, 96; Honduras,
Cod. Com. arts. 372, 804, 827; Mexico, Cod. Com. art. 75; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. arts.
20, 49, 398; Panama, Cod. Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Peru, Cod. Com.
arts. 197-297; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 721; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 512.
41. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 8, 87; Bolivia, Cod. Com. arts. 174-95; Brazil, Cod.
Com. arts. 99-118; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 3; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20; Costa Rica,
statutes of November 29, 1909, and December 3, 1909; Cuba, Cod. Com. arts. 184, 349-79;
Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 3; El Salvador, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 91; Guatemala, Cod. Com.
art. 1; Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 2; Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 1070; Mexico, Cod. Com. art.
75; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. arts. 20, 369; Panama, Cod. Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com.
art. 8; Peru, Cod. Com. arts. 67, 188, 344; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 7; Venezuela, Cod.
Com. art. 2.
42. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 8; Brazil, Cod. Com. arts. 457-796; Chile, Cod. Com.
art. 3; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20; Costa Rica, Cod. Com. arts. 530-646, 670-940; Cuba,
Cod. Com. arts. 573-869; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com. arts. 190-436; Ecuador, Cod.
Com. art. 3; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 3; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 1; Haiti, Cod.
Com. art. 2; Mexico, Cod. Com. art. 75; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. art. 20; Panama, Cod.
Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Peru, Cod. Com. arts. 67, 586; Uruguay, Cod.
Com. art. 7; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 2.
43. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 282-449; Bolivia, Cod. Com. arts. 225-306; Brazil, Cod.
Com. arts. 287-353, and decreto 22456; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 348; Colombia, Cod. Com.
art. 463; Costa Rica, statute of November 24, 1909; Cuba, Cod. Com. arts. 116-74,
218-38, statute of April 17, 1929; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com. arts. 19, 634; Ecuador,
Cod. Com. art. 261; El Salvador, Cod. Com. arts. 167-230, 302-30; Guatemala, Cod. Com.
art. 279; Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 20; Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 13; Mexico, Ley General
de Sociedades Mercantiles, and Ley General de Sociedades Cooperativas; Nicaragua, Cod.
Com. art. 118; Panama, Cod. Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. arts. 282-449; Peru,
Cod. Com. arts. 124-83; Uruguay, Cod. Com. arts. 387-512; Venezuela, Cod. Com.
art. 206.
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(11) security transactions, generally if collateral to an act of com-
merce 4
It is obvious that a serious problem arises from the fact that the
Latin-American codes often require that in order to consider the act a
commercial one, it must be performed with the intent of making a profit,
or that the purchase must be made with the intent of reselling or leas-
ing the goods for profit. In this type of case it is common that only one
of the parties has this necessary intent, while the other does not. Take,
for example, an instance of retail sale. In so far as the buyer is con-
cerned, the retail sale is a civil contract, because he is buying goods or
merchandise for consumption or use. On the other hand, the same act
is a commercial contract for the retailer, because this is a part of his
trade. His retail sale is the expected consequence of the acquisition of
the merchandise. He buys the goods with the intent of reselling or leas-
ing for profit.
The same difficulty arises when the codes take into account the status
of the parties to the transaction in order to determine whether the trans-
action is commercial or civil.4a Thus, as will be seen later, in many in-
stances the act or contract is considered commercial merely because it
was performed or agreed upon by a merchant in the normal course of his
business operations. It often happens that only one of the contracting
parties is a merchant, and the resulting effect is that the contract or act
is commercial with regard to the merchant, but civil with regard to the
other partyj 6
This difficulty has not been effectively solved by most of the Latin-
American codes, and many times the choice of whether the civil code or
44. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. S, 87; Bolivia, Cod. Com. arts. 149-73; Brazil, Cod.
Com. arts. 74-S6; Chile, Cod. Com. arts. 338-47; Colombia, Cod. Com. arts. 20, 435-63;
Costa Rica, Cod. Com. arts. 62, 120-49; Cuba, Cod. Com. arts. 281-302; Ecuador, Cod.
Com. arts. 3, 113-19; El Salvador, Cod. Com. arts. 137-54; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 1;
Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 2; Honduras, Cod. Corn. art. 355; fexico, Cod. Com. art. 7S;
N'icaragua, Cod. Com. art. 435; Panama, Cod. Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. arL 8;
Peru, Cod. Com. art. 275; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 7; Venezuela, Cod. Com. arL 2.
45. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 8; Bolivia, Cod. Com. art. 346; Brazil, Cod. Com. art.
256; Chile, Cod. Com. arts. 820-21; Colombia, Cod. Com. arts. 946-57; Costa Rica, Cod.
Com. art. 359; Cuba, Cod. Com. art. 439; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com. arL 91;
Ecuador, Cod. Com. arts. 533, 541; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 1; Haiti, Cod. Com. art.
91; Honduras, Cod. Com. arts. 1289, 1303, 1313; Mlexico, Cod. Com. art. 344 and Ley
General de Titulos y Operaciones de Craito; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. arts. CO. 05; Panama,
Cod. Com. art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Peru, Cod. Com. arts. 315, 430, 557; Uru-
guay, Cod. Com. arts. 603, 741; Venezuela, Cod. Com. arts. 515, 524.
46. The instances of contracts with the double character of commercial and civil are
many. It is suffident to think of the services rendered by commercial enterpris'- to their
customers. See Carvalho de Mlendonca, Tratado de Direito Comercial Brasileiro, 507
(2d ed. 1930).
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the commercial code will govern the case depends upon which of the
parties first appeals to the court to enforce the contract.41 Another solu-
tion is to divide the application of the rules, in so far as possible, be-
tween both parties. Thus, the rules of the commercial code will be ap-
plied to the merchant or to the party who performed the act or entered
into the agreement for profit, and the rules of the civil code will be
applied to the non-commercial party. The Supreme Court of Cassation of
Colombia held that the civil rules of evidence were to be applied to the
party with reference to whom the act was civil, and the commercial
rules of evidence were to be applied to the party for whom the act was
commercial.48 In five countries the law establishes an express solution
for such problems. The Codes of Argentina, Panama, Paraguay, Vene-
zuela, and Honduras declare that if the act is commercial for one of the
parties and not for the other, the entire transaction will be regulated
by the commercial law, i.e., that it will be commercial for both parties.40
There appears to be sufficient legal authority to conclude that in most
of the Latin-American countries, where the problem has not been ex-
pressly solved, the court will hold that if one party is a merchant, the
contract will be treated as commercial.5 0 The reasoning for such a de-
cision is that as the commercial codes have been enacted to regulate
the transactions and activities of merchants while carrying out their
trade, to exclude the application of a code with regard to the acts which
are not commercial for the other party would defeat the purposes of
commercial legislation.51 But the provisions of such codes are far from
47. 1 Olavarria Avila, Manual de Derecho Comercial, 190, 215 (1950). See also,
Vivante, Trattato di Diritto Commerciale, 186 (3d ed. 1896).
48. Casacion, 31 Julio 1936, XLIV, 95. The French Court of Casacion arrived at the
same conclusion in S. 1875. 1. 365; J. Pal. 1875, 880; D. 1875. 1. 229. Cf. Lyon-Caen
and Renault, Manuel de Droit Commercial, 380 (14th ed. 1924).
49. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 7; Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 5; Panama, Cod. Com.
art. 4; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 7; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 109. With regard to
Brazil, Joao de Oliveira Filho, quoting Carvalho de Mendonca, and art. 19 of the
Regulamento No. 737 of 1850, says that an act of commerce is such for both parties, and
not only for one of them. Hence, only the Code of Commerce controls. See 5 Carvalho
Santos, Repertorio Enciclopedico do Direito Brasileiro 3 (1947).
50. Olavarria Avila, op. cit. supra note 47, at 186, remarks that in Chile, the courts will
usually declare the act to be commercial, if one of the parties to the transaction is a
merchant.
51. Mezzera Alvarez, Curso de Derecho Comercial 84 (2d ed. 1951). That is also the
conclusion of the Uruguayan Court, see L.J.U., t. XVIII, case No. 2849. 1 Rodriguez Rod-
riguez, Curso de Derecho Mercantil 30 (2d ed. 1952), arrives at the same conclusion, that
is to say, that if the act is commercial for one of the parties and civil for the other,
it should be decided solely in accordance with the provisions of the commercial law. He
adds that art. 1050 of the Commercial Code of Mexico refers only to the applicable rules
of procedure which control the case and not to the substantive rules of law involved.
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being conclusive,"a and a contrary argument could be made that since
commercial law is a law of an exceptional nature as distinguished from
the civil law, it should be applied only to transactions and acts which
are commercial for both parties.
In general, it can be said that transactions and contracts with regard
to immovables are usually considered to be civil and not commercial in
their nature. Such was the traditional French doctrine"a which was
adopted by most of the Latin-American codes. Portalis, one of the draft-
ers of the Code Napoleon, wrote in the Discours preliminaire sur le Code
civil: "The distinction between immovables and movables (richcsses
mobilieres) establishes the idea of things civil in their nature and com-
mercial in their nature." This has also been the prevailing doctrine of
French courts 4 and thus, most of the Latin-American codes will consider
the sale and purchase of immovables to be subject to the regulations of
the civil codes, even if one or both parties entered into the transaction
with the intent of making a profit. There is also a tendency to regard
any type of transaction or contract related to immovables as being pure-
Article 1050 provides that if a suit arises with regard to an act which is commercial for
one of the parties and ciil for the other, the rules of commercial procedure will be fol-
lowed if the act is commercial for the defendant in the suit; and, vice versa if the de-
fendant is the party for whom the act is dvil, then the case will be litigated in accordance
with the rules of civil procedure.
52. Chile, Cod. Com. arts. 1, 3; Colombia, Cod. Com. arts. 1, 10, 20; Cuba, Cod. Com.
art. 2; El Salvador, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 5; Guatemala, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 5; Blexico, Cod.
Com. art. 1; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. art. 1; Peru, Cod. Com. art. 2; Uruguay, Cod. Com.
art. 6. The Code of Commerce of Ecuador furnishes additional ground to the doctrine
which declares such acts to be commercial by stating, in art. 140, that a contract is a com-
mercial contract if it has been entered into by a duly registered merchant. The confusion
in most of the Latin-American codes is further complicated by the fact that the purchase
of goods for consumption is expressly declared to be non-commercial. As we have seen
above, the sale of goods originally bought with the intent of reselling them for profit is
expressly considered to be a commercial transaction.
53. Lyon-Caen and Renault, op. cit. supra note 4S, at 32.
54. Cassation, June 4, 1850, D. 1850. 1. 163; Paris, February 15, 1863. S. 1863. 2. 259,
J. Pal. 1863. 1. 223, D. 1868. 2. 203; Cassation, April 18, 1332, S. 1882. 1. 407, J. Pal.
1882. 1. 1016; Lyon, July 10, 1901, D. 1904. 1. 347.
55. Olavarria Avila, op. it. supra note 47, at 19S; Fernandez, op. cit. supra note 33,
at 49; Mezzera Alvarez, op. cit. supra note 51, at 53; Siburu, op. cit. supra note 24, at
87; Malagarriga, Tratado Elemental de Derecho Comercial, 54 (1951); 1 Ferreira, Insti-
tucoes de Direito Comercial, 99-100 (1951); 5 Carvalho Santos, Repertorlo Enciclopadico
do Direito Brasileiro, S (1947). See Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 8, 452; Bolivia, Cod. Com.
art. 308; Brazil, Cod. Com. art. 191; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 3; Colombia, Cod. Com. art.
20; Costa Rica, Cod. Com. art. 307; Cuba, Cod. Com. art. 325; Ecuador, Cod. Com.
art. 3; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 3; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 1; Hait, Cod. Corn.
art. 2; Paraguay, Cod. Com. arts. S, 425; Peru, Cod. Com. art. 320; Uruguay, Cod. Com.
art. 516; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 2.
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ly civil in nature. 6 This conclusion is supported by the fact that im-
movables are not considered to be commercial merchandise under the
traditional French doctrine, and also by the more important factor that
the Latin-American commercial codes usually do not have provisions
regulating contracts on immovables. It is said, for instance, that a mort-
gage 5 7 taken out as collateral for a commercial transaction should be
considered commercial in accordance with the rule that the accessory
follows the principal, accesorio sequitur principalia.58 This conclusion,
however, will not substantially alter the respective duties and rights of
the parties to the transaction since mortgages are exclusively regulated
by the provisions of the civil code. Similar unsuccessful attempts have
been made seeking to place within the commercial category the lease
of immovables, or other transactions regarding immovables (usufruct,
rights of way, use) when the immovable is being employed in connec-
tion with commercial activities. Such attempts had no major significant
results because, whether they are commercial or non-commercial, the
transactions are substantially regulated by the civil code since most of
the commercial codes in Latin America do not have provisions concern-
ing transactions of this type. There has been a great deal of criticism
of this legal approach, mainly on the ground that transactions with re-
gard to immovables are, as a matter of fact, undertaken as a business
for profit by merchants," and, as such, should be regulated by the
code of commerce.
The Code of Commerce of Italy of 1883, covered such transactions
by providing regulations for contracts entered into with the intent of
making a profit with reference to negotiations involving immovables.Y0
This precedent has been followed in Latin America by the Codes of
Mexico, Panama, and Honduras. The Code of Commerce of Mexico,
article 75, II, and of Panama, article 2, section 5, provide that the sale
and purchase of immovables are commercial transactions if entered into
for profit. Article 763 of the Code of Commerce of Honduras provides
that purchase and sale of immovables are commercial if they are inci-
dental to the normal exploitation of a commercial enterprise, and the
Exposicidn de Motivos, that is to say, the message the Executive Power
56. See authors cited in note 55 supra.
57. In most of the Latin-American countries mortgages can be created only with re-
gard to immovable property and not to movables.
58. Fernandez, op. cit. supra note 33, ,at 49; Siburu, op. cit. supra note 24, at 103.
See the following Argentine cases: J.A. 1-241; 14-529; 25-690; 26-753; 27-1071; 37-388;
55-1023; 41-815; 45-381; 45-678; 57-984; 68-475; 34-165; 11-594; La Ley 4-393; Ola-
varria Avila, op. cit. supra note 47, at 203.
59. Malagarriga, op. cit. supra note 55, at 54, and doctrine cited therein.
60. See Vivante, op. cit. supra note 47, at 136.
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sent to the Honduran Congress when the project was submitted for its
consideration, declared that the nature of the object sold is immaterial.01
Hence, in Honduras, the commercial or civil nature of a contract for the
purchase or sale of an immovable will depend upon the nature of the
seller or buyer. If either one is an entrepreneur whose business is the
purchase and sale of immovables for profit, the contract will be com-
mercial.
In most of the Latin-American countries, agricultural activities are
governed by the civil code, and a contract for the sale of crops and agri-
cultural produce, regardless of the profit motive, will be considered a
civil contract, at least in so far as the seller is concerned. -
Finally, if a contract is not onerous but gratuitous, it will be consid-
ered as civil and not commercial. 3
The preceding constitutes a broad generalization, and in many in-
stances additional information may be required to determine fully
whether the act or contract in question falls within the commercial or
civil category. Case law (jurisprudencia) has made its contribution to-
ward a more specific definition of commercial and civil contracts. The
nature of this study will not permit a detailed analysis of this matter
61. Exposid6n de Motivos del Proyecto de Cddigo de Comercio, presentado al Sobera-
no Congreso Nadonal por el Ministerio de Hacienda, Credito Pdblico y Comerdo, Dr.
Urbano Quesada, p. 46, printed by Talleres Tipo-Litogrificos "A-iston", Tegucigalpa D.C.,
Honduras, 1950, in its edition of the Code of Commerce of Honduras.
62. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 452; Bolivia, Cod. Com. art. 303. The Brazilian and
Chilean Codes of Commerce are not specific, but this is also the conclusion of Brazilian
writers. See, e.g., Carvalho Santos, Joio de Oliveira Filho, Atos de Comercio, 5 Reper-
torio Encidopidico do Direito Brasileiro, 4 (1947); Chilean writer, Olavarria Avila, op.
cit. supra note 47, at 219. Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 22; Costa Rica, Cod. Com. art 307;
Cuba, Cod. Com. art. 326; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. S1. The Code of Commerce of
Haiti is not very dear, but it is very similar to art. 632 of the French Code of Commerce,
and in France the prevailing doctrine is to the effect that agricultural activities are dvil
and not commercial (Lyon-Caen and Renault, op. cit. supra note 25, at 33). Haitian
doctrine usually follows French. The question under Nicaraguan law is doubtful, eTpecially
when the producer has organized into an enterprise; it appears, however, that under arts.
20, 82 of the Code, agricultural activities will be considered civil activities. Solorzano, in
Glosas al Ctdigo de Comercio de Nicaragua (1949), is silent on this point. Paraguay,
Cod. Com. art. 452; Peru, Cod. Com. art. 321; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 516; Venezuela,
Cod. Con. art. 5. See also Fernandez, op. cit. supra note 33, at 60. There are four
countries where the situation is the opposite: in Ecuador (Cod. Com. art. 3 § 1); in
Guatemala (Cod. Com. art. 1, §§ 1, 2); in Honduras, provided the producer is organized
as a commercial enterprise (Cod. Com. art. 763); and in Mexico (Cod. Com. art. 75,
XXfII).
63. Fernandez, op. cit. supra note 33, at 49; Malagarriga, op. cit. supra note SS, at 53;
Siburu, op. cit. supra note 24, at S5; Rodriguez Rodriguez, op. cit. supra note 51, at 29;
1 Ferreira, op. cit. supra note 55, at 100-02; de Oliveira Filho, op. cit. supra note 49,
at 9; Mlezzera, op. ciLt. supra note 51, at 40-S3.
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with regard to each country, but the review of some cases may serve as
good illustration of what actually happens in Latin America. The fol-
lowing are Argentine cases chosen at random as instances of case-law 4
developments: an enterprise whose line of business is the management
of houses and apartments for rent is not commercial;08 brokerage is to
be considered commercial even if the contract entered into by two par-
ties with the assistance of the broker is a civil contract; 0 auctions are
commercial even if the thing sold is an immovable;07 show business is
commercial; 0 8 boarding houses are commercial if the families who under-
take to provide such services have made a business of the performance
of those services; 9 private hospitals and sanitariums are commercial; 10
the technical direction of the construction of buildings is civil," but there
is authority which declares this construction to be commercial if the
builder furnishes the materials.72
2. Subjective Acts of Commerce
Before the great French Ordinances of the 17th Century,73 commer-
cial law was "professional law" in the sense that it regulated the activi-
ties of a specific class, the merchants. 4 During the Middle Ages, com-
mercial activities were closely regulated by the guilds and corporaciones,
and a merchant was unmistakable, not only because of the specific nature
of his activities but also because of his formal membership in the mer-
chant guilds. But the growing powers of the bourgeoisie and the ever
increasing needs of trade found a barrier in the tight organization of the
64. The reader should not give to the expression "case-law" the usual meaning of the
common-law theory. "Case-law" is used in this text as the best available translation for
"jurisprudencia," "jurisprudence," "jurisprudenza." A case, in the common law, is a
source of law, in the sense that the judge will determine a principle or ratio decidendl
from it, in accordance with which he is bound to decide similar cases. At the civil law,
the principle or ratio decidendi is given to the judge in the codes, and there is no ques-
tion of determining a ratio decidendi but of giving more specific meaning to the ab-
stract terms of the law. This is the useful function of cases in civil law.
65. J. A. 61-793.
66. J. A. 10-625, 44-789.
67. La Ley 51-172; Gac. For. 193-458; Gac. Paz 80-169.
68. La Ley 55-69; 37-692; 25-653; 44-141.
69. La Ley 46-42.
70. La Ley 2-34; 14-743; 31-581.
71. La Ley 16-781.
72. Gac. Paz 79-590; La Ley 11-102.
73. Ordinance of 1673, known also as the "Code Savary," whose subject was the regu-
lation of non-maritime trade (commerce de terre, comercio terrestre) especially commer.
cial partnership, bill of exchange, bankruptcy, etc., and Ordinance of 1681, covering mari-
time trade.
74. See Arecha, La empresa comercial 63 (1948).
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guilds and corporaciones and thus, by the end of the 18th Century, an
important change took place: trade permeated the various classes of
society and commercial law ceased being exclusively the law of mer-
chants. Business activities spread, and acts of commerce were performed
by persons who were not formally merchants.
The need was felt of applying the commercial provisions to certain
types of acts (the acts of commerce) regardless of the qualities or na-
ture of the person who performed the act or entered into the transac-
tion. The French Ordinance of 1673 opened the way whereby the act
of commerce itself became the main source or ground to determine the
applicability of commercial law. As we have seen, this is the situation
today in most of the Latin-American countries. But the standard or test
based upon the quality or nature of the person performing the acts
was never entirely eliminated, nor could it be completely eliminated.
For one, there was the problem of determining whether the act was per-
formed or the contract entered into with the intent of making a profit.
Here a psychological element enters into the picture in order to make
commercial an act which would otherwise have been civil. The fact that
a merchant was a party to the transaction lent strong impetus to the
claim that the profit motive was present in a particular case. The factors
of rising capitalism, the progressive accumulation of wealth, the devel-
opment of new techniques and means of transportation and communi-
cation, the control of powerful sources of energy, the availability of new
machinery and equipment, and the mass production of merchandise and
goods for national and international markets added weight to the im-
portance of merchants in social and economic life, a change, the reper-
cussions of which were reflected in the commercial codes of the Con-
tinent and Latin America. The merchant and his auxiliaries were kept in
the codes, as subjects of detailed regulations, and the presence of a mer-
chant in a transaction showed a commercial nature. During the Middle
Ages and until the last quarter of the 18th Century, acts and transac-
tions were usually considered commercial if they were undertaken, per-
formed or agreed upon by merchants in the ordinary course of their
business. Merchants were the persons so qualified by their formal mem-
bership in merchant guilds and trade associations. But after the French
Revolution, the disappearance of guilds and corporaciones abrogated the
purely formal test of membership in a merchant guild. Some other cri-
terion had to be found if the commercial codes were to regulate the ac-
tivities of merchants. Nevertheless the rise of the objective test, i.e., the
per se acts of commerce, never brought about the complete elimination
of the subjective test, nor the disappearance of the merchants from the
codes as specific subjects of regulation. Therefore, the need for cer-
19571
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tain elements which would identify a person as a merchant was strongly
felt. The answer which was eventually found for this problem is an
excellent instance of circular reasoning in civil law: merchants were. the
persons who engaged, undertook or performed acts of commerce to earn
their livelihood. Thus in many instances an act will be considered com-
mercial because it is performed by a merchant, and a person is a mer-
chant because he performs a commercial act.75 This difficulty has been
solved to some extent by the institution known as the Register of Com-
merce wherein merchants or persons about to engage in commercial ac-
tivities are required to register. Today in Latin America both criteria
are employed to determine whether or not a person is a merchant: en-
gaging in commercial transactions and a listing in the Register of Com-
merce.
Practically all the Latin-American codes have followed the French
system as to the essential qualifications of a merchant. Usually a
merchant is described as one who: (1) performs acts of commerce,
(2) in his own name, (3) as a profession. 0 But the approach of the
Honduran Code of Commerce is somewhat different. This modern Code,
75. Id. at 64.
76. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 1; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 7; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 9.
The Costa Rican Code of Commerce, art. 1, required as an essential clement registration
at the Public Registry of Commerce, but this formality has been eliminated by statute
of October 15, 1901. Cuba, Cod. Com. art. 1; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com. art. 1;
Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 2; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 4; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 4;
Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 1; Mexico, Cod. Com. art. 3; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. art. 6; Panama,
Cod. Com. art. 28; Peru, Cod. Com. art. 1. The Uruguayan Code of Commerce, art. 1,
also required registration at the Public Registry of Commerce, but this formality was set
aside by statute (decreto-ley) No. 888 of July 27, 1867. Venezuela, art. 10. In Brazil
art. 4 of the Code of Commerce requires registration as an essential requisite, but Bevila-
qua in his annotation to this article holds that it is not a requisite since non sola matrlcu-
la, sed mercature facit mercatorem (not only registration but doing business makes a per-
son a merchant). Achilles Bevilaqua, Codigo Comercial Brasileiro 13 (8th ed. 1945).
Accord, C. Ap. December 15, 1931. This same conclusion is in 2 Carvalho de Mendonca,
Tratado de Direito Commercial Brasileiro, 24 (2d ed. 1933). The Bolivian Code of Com-
merce, art. 1, appears to have followed the Spanish Commercial Code of 1829, requiring
formal registration as a condition for the recognition of a person as a merchant. Fernando
Bedoya, a Bolivian lawyer whom we have consulted on this matter, thinks that the ques-
tion is doubtful. It could be held that a non-registered person who in Bolivia engages In
the performance of acts of commerce as a profession is a merchant, even though deprived
of the benefits and privileges the commercial law grants to merchants. On the other
hand, by strict adherence to the letter of the Code, a procedure followed very often by
Bolivian courts, it could be held that registration is an essential, sine qua non require-
ment without which a person cannot be deemed to be a merchant. No cases on this
matter have been found in the reports available: Jurisprudencia Nacional, Cochabamba,
Bolivia, edited by Guillermo Urquidi and Jurisprudencla Comentada de la Excma. Corte
Suprema de Justicia, 1946, by Rodolfo Virreira Flor.
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under the influence of certain German doctrine, has brought to the
foreground the notion of enterprise, stating that an act or transaction is
to be considered commercial, not because of any peculiar or intrinsic ele-
ment, but merely because of its repetition in many cases (actos o trans-
acciones en masa). The permanent element in reference to acts which
are repeated many times is the commercial organization, the enterprise,
which performs them. It is irrelevant whether the enterprise be owned
by a person or a commercial association. 7 The Honduran Code of Com-
merce does not define an enterprise, but the Exposicidn de Motivos makes
reference to the prevailing doctrine which visualizes an enterprise as an
organization of capital, labor and other intangible elements of economic
value, whose purposes are the performance of economic activities.7  The
operation of an enterprise, its conveyance, winding up its affairs and such
other analogous activities, are deemed to be commercial acts. As can
be seen, in the Code of Commerce of Honduras, the basic concept is the
concept of enterprise. Thus, it is only reasonable that the Code defines
merchants as those persons who own a commercial enterprise.
It can generally be said that a professional practice makes a person
a merchant if the acts performed are acts of commerce. In so far as
associations are concerned, this is not the only manner available in which
one can qualify as a merchant. There are certain types of associations
which are commercial per se, that is to say, the form of the association
itself may make it a commercial association, a merchant, provided cer-
tain formalities are met. It is here that reference should be made again
to a basic civil-law distinction which is not familiar, or, if familiar, not
very important in common-law jurisdictions. The Latin-American civil
law distinguishes between commercial partnerships and civil partner-
ships7 9 and subjects them to different legal requirements and conse-
quences. For instance, today there is no doubt that commercial part-
nerships are endowed with juridical personality, while there is a serious
question, at least in several Latin-American countries, as to whether civil
77. Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 2.
78. Arecha, op. cit. supra note 74, at 202 lists the following essential component
elements of an enterprise: (a) capital; (b) organization; (c) labor.
79. A warning with regard to terminology: the civil-law lawyer always speaks of
sociedad, sociedade, sodeti, socit6, and these terms cannot be translated into the English
term "society" which conveys quite a different meaning. These foreign terms are words
of a very broad meaning, signifying business and non-business associations, incorporated
as well as unincorporated. As the reader will immediately realize, there is no equivalent
in English to the Spanish sociedad, or the Portuguese sociedade, or the Italian societa,
or the French socit. The only convenient way to solve the difficulty is to resort to the
the word "partnership" advising the reader that this word is given a broader meaning than
the one recognized by English legal terminology, thus including partnerships proper and
also corporations.
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partnerships (sociedad civil) have or have not a juridical personality.80
80. In Argentina and Paraguay the prevailing legal opinion recognizes the juristic per-
sonality of commercial partnerships or rather that which amounts to the same thing,
namely a commercial partnership acts as if it were a juristic person, on the basis of a
legal construction made by application of arts. 291, 300, 406, 413, 414, 417, 443 of the
Code of Commerce (see Malagarriga, op. cit. supra note 55, at 180, and the doctrine
cited therein). With regard to civil partnerships the situation is doubtful although there
appears to be a certain amount of agreement that a civil partnership is entitled to own
property and to perform legal acts in its own name. (See 1 Salvat, Tratado de Derecho
Civil Argentino 605-09 (8th ed. 1947)). In Bolivia there are good grounds to arrive at
the same conclusion, at least with regard to commercial partnerships, on the basis of
arts. 231, 233, 237, 238, 239, 241, 249, 297, 298 of the Code of Commerce, art. 1171 of
the Decreto Supreme of March 8, 1860, enacted as statute on November 13, 1886, and
art. 3 of Decreto Supreme of September 1877. (See Carlos Walter Urquldi, Regimen
Legal Boliviano en Diversas Materias 120 (1947)). With regard to civil and commercial
partnerships, art. 16, livro 1, titulo 1, of the Brazilian Civil Code declares that they are
juristic persons. See 5 Clovis Bevilaqua, C6digo Civil dos Estados Unidos do Brasil Com-
mentado 116 (8th ed. 1952), holding that a civil partnership becomes a juristic person
as soon as it is duly registered. Some conclusion with reference to commercial partner-
ships is arrived at by Martins Ferreira, Instituqoes de Direito Comercial 225 (1951). Ar-
tice 2053 of the Civil Code of Chile and art. 2079 of the Civil Code of Colombia declare
that a partnership is a juristic person. This applies not only to civil partnerships but
also to commercial partnerships. 2 Olavarria Avila, op. cit. supra note 47, at 17; Valencia
Zea, Curse de Derecho Civil Colombiano, Bogota, 1949, t. VII and VIII, p. 86; and Casa-
cion, Colombia, March 3, 1938, XLVI, 128, and March 21, 1922, XXIX, 119. In Costa
Rica, doubt which existed under Titulo VII of the Code appears to have been eliminated
by art. 2 of statute N. 218 of August 8, 1939 and there are good grounds for holding
that a civil partnership is a juristic person. The statute of November 24, 1909 on commer-
cial partnership considers them to be judicial persons (art. 2). In Cuba, commercial and
civil partnerships have juristic personality (Cod. Com. art. 116, Cod. Civ. arts. 35, 1669).
See also 3 Camus, Codigo Civil Explicado, 423 (1945). The same concept applies in
Ecuador, Cod. Civ. art. 2076, Cod. Com. art. 262; El Salvador, Cod. Civ. arts. 619, 2010;
Guatemala, Cod. Civ. art. 15, Cod. Com. art. 288; Honduras, Cod. Civ. art. 1795, Cod.
Com. art. 15; Nicaragua, Cod. Civ. art. 3188, Cod. Com. art. 118; Panama, Cod. Civ.
art. 1360, Cod. Com. art. 251; Peru, Cod. Civ. art. 1689, Cod. Com. art. 124. While the
question is doubtful in Haiti, it will probably be held that the legal status of partnerships
is the same, because of the influence which French doctrine and French case law have in
Haiti. Abel Nicolas Leger in his annotated edition of the Civil Code of Haiti approvingly
quotes decisions of the French Court of Cassation which have recognized the legal per-
sonality of partnerships (see Leger, Code Civil dHaiti Annote 694 (1931); Cassation
February 23, 1891, D. P. 91. 1. 337; March 2, 1892, D. P. 93. 1. 169; January 2, 1894,
D. P. 94. 1. 81). In Mexico the statute on commercial partnerships, Ley General do
Sociedades Mercantiles, art. 21, declares a commercial partnership to be a juristic person.
With regard to civil partnerships, the Civil Code is silent, but the opinion has been ex-
pressed that they also have legal personality (Rojinas Villegas, Derecho Civil: Contratos
460 (1944). In Uruguay, by statute No. 10793 of September 25, 1946, art. 19, com-
mercial partnerships are declared to be juristic persons. The question is doubtful with
reference to civil partnerships and 2 Mezzera-Alvarez, op. cit. supra note 51, at 22, is
of the opinion that they are not juristic persons. In Venezuela, commercial as well as civil
partnerships are juristic persons (Cod. Com. art. 201 and Cod. Civ. art. 1651).
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The distinction between a commercial and a civil partnership is usually
made on either of two grounds: the purposes of the partnership or its
form. A partnership, either civil or commercial, usually requires two or
more persons who contribute either capital or personal services for the
achievement of a certain common objective, sharing profits and losses.8 '
In both types of partnerships the motive of profit is present, so this
motive can not be the grounds for the distinction8 2 Normally, a part-
nership is considered commercial if its purposes are the performance of
acts of commerce, while a partnership is considered civil if its profits
81. Argentina, Cod. Civ. art. 1648, Cod. Com. art. 282; Bolivia, Cod. Civ. art. 12c0;
Brazil, Cod. Civ. art. 1363, Cod. Com. arts. 2S7, 283; Chile, Cod. Civ. arL 2083; Colom-
bia, Cod. Civ. art. 2079; Costa Rica, Cod. Civ. arts. 1196, 1203, 1205; Cuba, Cod. Civ.
art. 1665, Cod. Com. art. 116; Ecuador, Cod. Civ. art. 2076, Cod. Com. art. 261; El Sal-
vador, Cod. Civ. art. 2010; Guatemala, Cod. Civ. art. 1776; Haiti, Cod. Civ. art. 1601;
Honduras, Cod. Civ. art. 17S2; Mexico, Cod. Civ. art. 2633; Nicaragua, Cod. Civ. art.
3175; Panama, Cod. Civ. art. 1356; Peru, Cod. Civ. art. 16S6, Cod. Com. art. 124; Uru-
guay, Cod. Civ. art. 1375, Cod. Com. art. 3S7; Venezuela, Cod. Civ. art. 1649. Some Latin-
American as well as continental writers also mention as a requisite a psychological ele-
meat, the affectio societatis.
There is no agreement as to what is meant by this expression and the opinion has
been advanced that it is not an independent requirement, but simply consent to organize
a partnership. Those who deny the validity of this requisite usually argue that it is mere
tautology, i.e., that in order to create a partnership, the partners ought to intend the
creation of a partnership. (See 1 Malagarriga, op. cit. supra note 55, at 171, and quo-
tations therein of 1 J. Garrigues, Tratato de Derecho Mlercantil, t. 1, p. 403, and 1 Garo
Sodedades Comerciales t. 1, p. 105). This position has been accepted in a well known
Argentinian case, La Ley 58-541. On the other hand, it has been held that affectio ro-
cietatis is a necessary element, meaning the intent of creating a partnership (3 Castillo,
Curso de Derecho Comercial 31 (1951) ; 7 Valencia Zea, op. cit. supra note S0, at 83) or
the intent of undertaking a common endeavor (el fin de realizar una empreca comun, 1
Rojina Villegas, op. cit. supra note SO, at 463). The prevailing opinion appears to hold
that affectio societatis is necessary, although it finally boils dovn to an intangible element
which characterizes a common endeavor where all the participants are in the potiion of
enjoying reciprocal rights, as collaborators, even though there may be some difference-
as to the concrete extent of each partner's rights (Malagarriga, op. cit. supra note 55,
t. 1, p. 173). See also 5c. Bevilaqua, Codigo Civil dos Estados Unidos do Brasil Com-
mentado, 114 (8th ed. 1952); 6 Salvat, Tratado de Derecho Civil Argentino 5 (1946);
Loreto Arismendi, Tratado de las Sociedades Chiles y Mercantiles 79 (2d ed. 1980).
82. There is, of course, a type of association where the profit motive Is not prezent,
e.g., the case of institutions or clubs or entities organized for purposes other than that of
making profit, such as cultural, charitable, or athletic entities. These are generally called
asociadones or asociaciones civiles and are subject to specific regulations. In most of the
cases, they are not considered juristic persons unless the executive power has granted
them juridical personality, or they have been duly registered. See Paez, El Dleecho de
las Asociaciones (1940). The asociaciones are civil in their nature. Caveat as to termi-
nology: the expression partnership is reserved in this Article for a civil or commercial
entity organized with the intent of making and distributing profits among its members
The word association will be used as the equivalent of asociacion.
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are to be made in the performance of civil acts, for example, in most of
the countries, by undertaking business in the real estate field.8 3 There
may be some difficulties when there are doubts as to the civil or com-
mercial nature of the acts. The decisive element then becomes the na-
ture of the parties, i.e., whether or not they are merchants. This ques-
tion is usually disposed of by the application of a formal test, that is to
say, that certain types of partnerships will be considered commercial by
their -very form and by the fact of the registration of the partnership
agreement in the Public Register of Commerce. The Latin-American
codes usually apply to three types of partnerships: the collective part-
nership,84 the limited partnership,8 5 and the corporation (sociedad andni-
83. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 282; 3 Carvalho de Mendoca, Tratado di Direlto Com-
mercial Brasileiro 51 (1945), quotes arts. 311, 315, 317, 325 of the Code of Commerce in
support of his thesis that the distinguishing feature is the purpose to be achieved by the
partnership: a commercial purpose (art. 31), or to do business (art. 315), or to under-
take commercial transactions (arts. 319, 325). Costa Rica, statute no. 6 of November 21,
1909, art. 1; Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 261; Nicaragua, Cod. Civ. art. 3191, but if a
partnership simultaneously performs acts of commerce and civil acts, it will be considered
a civil partnership, Cod. Civ. art. 3194. See also Solorzano, Glosas al C6dlgo de Comerclo
de Nicaragua 85 (1950); Panama, Cod. Com. art. 249; Chile, Cod. Civ. art. 2059; (2 Ola-
varria, op. cit. supra note 47, at 19); Colombia, Cod. Civ. art. 285; 7-8 Valencia Zea,
Curso de Derecho Civil Colombiano 87 (1949); El Salvador, Cod. Civ. art. 2016; Vene-
zuela, Cod. Com. art. 200. 2 Mezzera Alvarez, op. cit. supra note 51, at 22, holds with
regard to Uruguayan law, that the nature of the activities of the partnerships, i.e., whether
they perform acts of commerce or civil acts, is the test to be applied in determining if it
is a commercial or civil partnership, unless it is a commercial partnership by reason of its
form.
84. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 301; Bolivia, Cod. Corn. art. 226; Brazil, Cod. Com.
art. 315; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 349; Colombia, Cod. Com. arts. 463, 464; Costa Rica,
statute of November 24, 1909, art. 40; Cuba, Cod. Com. art. 125; Dominican Republic,
Cod. Corn. art. 20; Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 267; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 167;
Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 372; Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 21; Honduras, Cod. Com. art.
38; Mexico, Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles art. 25; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. art.
133; Panama, Cod. Com. art. 297; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 301; Peru, Cod. Com.
art. 133; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 453; Venezuela, Cod. Corn. art. 227. The collective
partnership offers certain similarities with the American general partnership (unlimited
liability of the partners) but it differs widely in other aspects: the collective partnership
requires the fulfillment of certain formalities before it can be considered a valid collective
partnership, the most important of which is registration of the written agreement at the
Public Register of Commerce; and a collective partnership is considered a juristic person
with different rights and duties from those of the partners.
85. Argentina, Cod. Corn. art. 372; Bolivia, Cod. Com. art. 227; Brazil, Cod. Com.
art. 311; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 470; Colombia, Cod. Com. arts. 463, 596; Costa Rica,
statute of November 24, 1909, arts. 58, 128; Cuba, Cod. Corn. art. 145; Dominican Republic,
Cod. Com. art. 23; Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 275; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 302;
Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 419; Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 24; Honduras, Cod. Com. arts.
58, 271; Mexico, Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles, arts. 51, 207; Nicaragua, Cod.
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ma o compahia andnima).,s  Some countries have other types of partner-
ships: the limited liability partnership (sociedad de responsabilidad
limitada) ,7 and the cooperative partnership.8 There is a tendency to
Com. arts. 192, 287; Panama, Cod. Com. arts. 330, 347; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 372;
Peru, Cod. Com. art. 153; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 425; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 239.
This type of partnership is called sodedad en comandita, and its basic structure is similar
to the American limited partnership: certain partners are liable only up to the amount of
the capital they have contributed. They are called comanditarios (limited or sp-dal part-
ners), and in most of the countries it is a necessary condition of their limited liability
that they have no word in managing the partnership. Management is vested in the un-
limited partners (comanditores o gestores).
86. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 313; Bolivia, Cod. Com. art. 223; Brazil, decreto-lei
No. 2627 of 1940; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 424; Colombia, arts. 463-550; Costa Rica, statute
of November 24, 1909; Cuba, Cod. Com. art. 151; Dominican Republic, Cod. Com.
art. 31; Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 285; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 231; Guatemala,
Cod. Com. art. 384; Haiti, Cod. Com. art. 30; Honduras, Cod. Com. art. SD; Mexico,
Ley General de Sociedades Afercantiles, art. 87; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. art. 201; Panama,
statute no. 32 of 1927, statute no. 9 of 1946; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 313; Peru, Cod.
Com. art. 159; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 403; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 242. The sociedad
an6nima or compafhia an6nima is, in its basic structure, similar to the American corpora-
tion although there are certain important differences as to the theory of corporate per-
sonality, duties of management, remedies and capital structure.
87. Argentina, statute No. 11645; Bolivia, statute of March 12, 1941; Brazil, statute
No. 3708; Colombia, statute No. 124 of 1937; Cuba, statute of April 17, 1929; Guatemala,
Cod. Com. art. 445; Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 66; Mexico, Ley General de Sociedades
Mercantiles, art. 58; Uruguay, decreto-ley No. 8992 of April 26, 1933; Venezuela, Cod.
Com. art. 312. In Nicaragua by statutory amendment of June 13, 1394 to the Commer-
cial Code, the partner who manages a limited partnership (sociedad en comandita) is per-
mitted to limit his liability to the amount of the capital he contributed. In fact, this
appears to permit a limited partnership (sociedad en comandita) to become a limited lia-
bility partnership (sociedad de responsabilidad limitada) but there is a provision in the
Code of Commerce which raises doubts as to this limitation of liability. Article 137,
second paragraph, reads: "But the partners may limit their liability by agreement pro-
vided that they add to the name of the partnership the world limited.'1 ' ("Pero pueden
por pacto los soeios limitar su responsabilidad, con tal que so agregue a la razon social
la paIabra 'limitada' ). This paragraph may be construed to mean that the partners may
agree that their liabilities will be limited as to third parties or that the limitation of lia-
bility will be valid only among themselves. Solorzano, op. cit. supra note 62, at 104,
quotes approvingly French and Spanish doctrine which limit the scope and meaning of
the article to the second situation. The limited liability partnership (sociedad de respona-
bilidad limitada) is almost unknown in the United States. The main features of the lim-
ited liability partnership are these: juristic personality, limited liability of the partners,
and concentration of management. There are, on the other hand, certain limitations as
to the transferability of shares to other persons. This form of business partnership has
many of the advantages of the corporation, while, at the same time, it avoids the complex
formalities which most of the Latin-American countries have imposed upon the creation
and operation of corporations. See Special Report on the Foreign Corporation Laws of
Ten Latin-American Republics, Proceedings of the Nimth Conference of the Inter-Ameri-
can Bar Conference 163-226 (1956), and the very useful summaries on this matter pre-
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consider all these partnerships as commercial because of their form of
organization, but this is not always conclusive. A problem arises when
a partnership is partially or totally engaged in the performance of acts
of a civil nature. The question is difficult and both classifications have
been upheld, some courts holding that they are civil partnerships and
others that -they are commercial partnerships. 89 Both individual mer-
pared by the Division of Law and Treaties of the Department of International Law, Pan
American Union, Washington, D.C. This explains why the corporate form of doing
business has not been sufficiently developed in Latin America. In fact, the corporate form
is used in Latin America only when a very substantial amount of capital is needed.
88. Argentina, Cod. Coin. art. 392; Brazil, decreto No. 22239 of December 19, 1932;
Ecuador, Ley de Cooperativas of November 30, 1937; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 313;
Guatemala, decreto No. 643; Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 278; Mexico, Ley General do
Sodedades Cooperativas of February 15, 1938; Nicaragua, Cod. Com. art. 300; Panama,
Cod. Com. art. 474; Uruguay, statute No. 10761; Venezuela, Ley Especial do Coopera-
tivas of August 15, 1942. These cooperatives are an outgrowth of the movement inspired
by the pioneers of Rochdae.
89. 1 Rojina Villegas, op. cit. supra note 80, at 462, speaking of Mexican partnership,
comments on art. 2695 of the Civil Code for the Federal District of Mexico which pro-
vides that partnerships of a civil nature organized under the form of a commercial part-
nership are subject to the regulation of the Code of Commerce. Commercial partnerships
are collective partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, and corpora-
tions. Therefore, concludes Rojina Villegas, if a partnership has been organized to under-
take civil transactions but adopts a commercial form, it will be considered a commercial
partnership. The form will prevail over the substance. The same question was discussed
in Primer Congreso Argentino de Derecho Comercial, Actas, t. 1, pp. 173-78, t. 2, p. 27 ff.,
and t. 3, p. 420 ff., with regard to corporations engaged in civil transactions. The opinion
of the jurists present were sharply divided (see 1 Malagarriga op. cit. supra note 55, t. 1,
at 166-69). Article 116 of the Cuban Code of Commerce states that any partnership or-
ganized in accordance with the provisions of the Code is commercial whatever its class
might be (". . . cualquiera que fuese su clase"). This provision gave rise to a controversy
which is still raging. A group of jurists argue that, notwithstanding art. 116 of the Code
of Commerce, the form of the partnership itself is not sufficient to make a partnership
a commercial one, and to this effect they quote Cod. Com. arts. 123, 124, 177. See Lopez
de Goicoechea, Las Sociedades Mercantiles en el Derecho Cubano 78 (1953); Gutierrez
de Celis, Prologue to the aforementioned book, at 10; Martinez Escobar, Soceodades
Civiles y Mercantiles 5 (1949). Other Cuban lawyers think otherwise, emphasizing art.
116 of the Code of Commerce. In their opinion, any partnership, whatever its activities,
is commercial if the form adopted has been regulated by the Code of Commerce. See
Cueto, Las Sociedades Civiles con Formas Mercantiles (1891), quoted by Aleman, Las
Sociedades Mercantiles en el Derecho Vigente 36-39 (1919); Betancourt, Codigo Civil
73 (3d ed. 1917). 2 Mezzera Alvarez, op. cit. supra note 51, at 22, is of the opinion that
in Uruguay, corporations, limited liability partnerships, and cooperatives are always com-
mercial because of their form, and the nature of their activities is immhterial. For Pineda
Leon, op. cit. supra note 15, at 322, the question is difficult under Venezuelan legislation,
but he is inclined to think that the predominant nature of the activities of the partner-
ship will decide the issue. In Haiti, Louis Borno is of the opinion that a partnership is
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chants and commercial partnerships are required to register in the Public
Register of Commerce." This is a legal duty; violations are punished
by law. Merchants who fail to register are deprived of the privileges
and the benefits granted to them by the code of commerce (especially
with reference to types of evidence permitted, the statute of limitations,
and creditors' agreements). In the case of partnerships, the most common
sanction for nonregistry is that all of the partners will incur unlimited
liability,91 or at least those partners who were guilty of failing to regis-
ter the partnership or who entered into transactions with third parties
commercial or dvi, not because of its form, but exclusively because of the nature of its
activities. Borno, Code de Commerce d'Haiti Annote, Comment to art. 19 (1910).
90. Most Latin-American countries maintain a Public Register of Commerce where
individual merchants and commercial partnerships are required by law to register, fur-
nishing data as to their business, organization, authority, purposes, etc. This is the mod-
em expression of the old tradition which made of merchants a class of persons enjoying
certain privileges because of their membership in merchant guilds and corporaciones. See
Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 25; Bolivia, Cod. Com. art. S; Brazil, Cod. Com. art. 4; Chile,
Cod. Com. art. 20; Colombia, Leyes 2S de 1931, 3S de 1932, Decreto 1750 de 1942; Costa
Rica, Cod. Com. art. 21, and statute No. 13 of June 21, 1901; Cuba, Cod. Com. art. 16;
Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 21; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 11; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art.
53 (only for partnerships); Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 334; Mexico, Cod. Com. art. 18;
Nicaragua, Cod. Com. art. 13; Panama, Cod. Com. arts. 34, 55; Paraguay, Cod. Com.
art. 25; Peru, Cod. Com. art. 16; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 32; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art.
17. Haiti and the Dominican Republic are the only countries where such a register has
not been organized, but certain publicity is still required with regard to several acts, to
protect the rights of third parties. (See Haiti, Cod. Com. arts. 3, 35 his, 38, 44, etc.).
In Mexico (Cod. Com. art. 19), Cuba (Cod. Com. art. 16),'and Peru (Cod. Com. art.
17) the registration, though mandatory for partnerships, is optional for the individual
merchant, although the availability of certain advantages is limited to those who do regis-
ter (this is, then, indirect compulsion). In Chile and Venezuela, individual merchants
are only required to file certain types of documents.
91. Argentina, Cod. Com. arts. 28, 294, 296, and 1 Fernandez, op. cit. supra note 33,
409; Brazil, Cod. Com. art. 301, and annotation thereto by Bevilaqua, op. cit. -supra note
31, at 120; Paraguay, Cod. Com. arts. 2SS, 294, 296. In El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 171,
and in Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 305, the Codes are ambiguous but there apper to be
sufficient grounds to hold that only the partners who entered into a transaction on behalf
of the partnership which has not been duly registered are the ones who are unlimitedly
liable; in Panama, arts. 251 and 254 of the Code of Commerce are apparently contradic-
tory. Under the first, all the partners are unlimitedly liable, while, by virtue of the sec-
ond, only those partners who contracted with third parties on behalf of the non-registered
partnership are liable. A recent judicial decision, of which only the syllabus has been
available to this author, declared that a third party who sued one partner unlimitedly
liable is not prevented thereby from suing another partner who is also unlimitedly liable,
if the first judgment could not be executed (R.J. No. 72 of 1920, at 736). In Uruguay
the question has not been settled by the Code, but 2 Mazzera Alvarez, op. cit. supra note
51, at 113, on the basis of arts. 401 and 402 of the Code of Commerce, is of the opinion
that the liability of all the partners is unlimited unless the third party nImos that the
partnership entailed limited liability for all or some of the partners.
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regardless of the fact that the partnership had not been duly regis-
tered. 2
A further question arises, namely, will the mere fact of registration be
sufficient to consider the registered person or partnership a merchant?
With regard to persons, registration creates a rebuttable presumption
that they are merchants. To qualify as a merchant it will be necessary
to prove that the person in question engaged in the performance of acts
of commerce in his own name, as a profession. This is really the decisive
test.93 In the case of partnerships, as indicated above, a distinction is
made: certain partnerships will be considered commercial whatever their
activities may be,94 while others will have to prove that their activities
were commercial in nature.
The codes have kept the subjective test in order to determine whether
or not an act is commercial, even though the prevailing test today, under
92. Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 344, with regard to those partners who made transac-
tions with third parties; Cuba, Cod. Com. art. 119, idem; Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 17,
idem; Mexico, Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles art. 2; Peru, Cod. Com. art. 128.
There is a difficult problem of statutory construction on this matter in the Nicaraguan
Code of Commerce. Article 19 provides for sanctions to be incurred by the merchants
who do not register but art. 19 has no proviso with reference to the unlimited liability
of the partners, dealing only with the loss of the partnership's juridical personality. Arti-
cle 126 states that the partners who have contracted with third parties will incur un-
limited liability vis-a-vis these third parties if the formalities required by law have not
been met (for instance, if they have failed to reduce the partnership agreement to a no-
tarial instrument, escritura pfiblica). Solorzano, in his Glosas to art. 126, appears to con-
strue this article in a restrictive manner. Therefore, it might be held that If the agree-
ment has been reduced to escritura ptiblica but not registered, the legal consequence would
be loss of juridical personality, but not unlimited liability. The Venezuelan Code of Com-
merce, art. 219, states that if the formal written agreement is not registered, the managers,
the promoters and any other person who acted on behalf of the partnership will be un-
limitedly liable. In Costa Rica, by virtue of art. 8, statute No. 6 of November 24, 1909,
the promoters (socios fundadores) become unlimitedly liable.
93. Thus, for instance, certain codes provide that if a person engages in the per-
formance of acts of commerce in a haphazard way, he will not be considered as a mer-
chant, although the acts of commerce performed are subject to regulations of the code of
commerce. See, e.g., Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 6; Chile, Cod. Com. art. 8; Costa Rica,
Cod. Com. art. 2; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 5; Guatemala, Cod. Com. art. 5; Panama,
Cod. Com. art. 30; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 6; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 6. The Hon-
duran Code obviously requires habituality in the performance of acts of commerce, for
that is the basis of its definition of commerce as such. The Mexican Code appears to
arrive at the same conclusion, in spite of what might seem to be a provision to the con-
trary in art. 4 of the Code of Commerce. See 1 Rodriguez, op. cit. supra note 51, at 37-38.
94. This generally applies to corporations and limited liability partnerships (see
Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 8; El Salvador, Cod. Com. art. 3; Honduras, Cod. Com. art.
13; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 7; Mexico, Ley General de
Sociedades Mercantiles, art. 1).
LATIN-AMERICAN LAW
the inspiration of the French Code of Commerce, is the objective one.
The subjective test is applied by following different techniques. The
first, and perhaps the most important, is to consider as commercial the
activities of certain types of enterprises without any further qualifica-
tionsf. 5 Thus, the Codes of Commerce of Argentina, Uruguay and Para-
guay declare as commercial the transactions and negotiations, within
their specific scope of business, of factories, storehouses, carriers, insur-
ance companies, and enterprises specializing in commercial agencies and
commissions. 6 The Chilean, Colombian, Ecuadorian, Salvadorian and
Venezuelan Codes of Commerce do the same with regard to factories,
manufacturing concerns, stores, groceries, coffee shops, carriers, store-
houses, enterprises devoted to commercial agency and commissions, in-
surance companies, and theatrical enterprises. 7 The Civil Code of
Mexico lists the following: wholesale stores, building enterprises, fac-
tories, manufacturing concerns, carriers, bookstores, printing companies,
enterprises devoted to commercial agency and commissions, theatrical
enterprises.9s The second procedure whereby the subjective test becomes
material is to declare that the activities of merchants in the carrying
out of their businesses are subject to the regulations of the code of com-
merce.9 9 In other words if a merchant is a party to a certain transaction
and a question arises as to the formalities required in the making of
the transaction, the type of evidence available, the rules of construction
applicable, or the significance of customary usage, it will be wise to re-
sort to the code of commerce for an answer in those countries where
95. The list which follows is not all-inclusive; the text is limited to the most important
examples.
96. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 8; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 8; Uruguay, Cod. Com.
art. 7.
97. Chile, Cod. Com. art. 3; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 20; El Salvador, Cod. Com.
art. 3; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 2; Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 3. Ecuador does not in-
lude theatrical enterprises.
98. Mexico, Cod. Com. art. 75. Article 632 of the Code of Commerce of the Domini-
can Republic lists the following enterprises: manufacturing, commission, transportation,
agencies, theatrical activities, etc.
99. Chile, Cod. Com. art. 1; Ecuador, Cod. Com. art. 1; El Salvador, Cod. Com.
art. 1; Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 1; Venezuela, Cod. Com. art. 1. This does not of cours
mean that all the activities of a merchant wil be considered commercial, nor that every
business transaction will be considered commercial. For instance, in most of the Latin-
American countries the purchase of a building to install a shop will be considered a civil
transaction. But it does mean that where transactions and business on movables re-
late to the main activity of the merchant (provided that this main activity is objec-
tively commercial), they will usually be considered as commercial. This shows the
typical combination of the objective and subjective tests in Latin America. Article 632
of the Code of Commerce of the Dominican Republic considers as commercial the trans-
actions entered into between merchants.
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the commercial code subjects the merchant to its regulations. And even
in countries whose commercial codes are silent on activities of merchants,
there are strong indications that a lawyer's course of action should be
the same, taking into account the control of the activities of merchants
as a profession, by all the codes.100 The third procedure is to declare
as commercial the acts performed by merchants within the scope of, or
as incidental to, the carrying on of their businesses; 101 and the fourth, and
100. In this connection the reader should recall what has been said above about the
duty to register, and the duty to carry account books adhering strictly to the pro-
visions of the codes of commerce, and about the value of such books as evidence.
101. Honduras, Cod. Com. art. 3. See also, Exposici6n de Motivos at 6; Venezuela,
Cod. Com. art. 3, excluding the cases in which it is apparent from the act itself that it
is not commercial or that it is essentially civil in its nature. This provision, which the
reader may realize is not clear, has been construed by the Superior Court of the Federal
District, Caracas, by decision of August 14, 1936, in the following terms: "All the acts
and obligations, deriving either from contracts or extracontractual sources, performed by
a merchant or binding a merchant are commercial, unless the contrary conclusion flows
from the act itself, or if the contracts and obligations are essentially civil by their very
nature." This means that all the juridical activities of a merchant are presumed by the law
to be commercial, exception being made as to acts or obligations essentially civil. Thus,
a loan made to a merchant will not be commercial if from the terms of the contract It
is apparent that the money is to be invested in an activity which is not commercial.
The adoption or recognition of children by a merchant, or the division of an inheritance
are not commercial, even if performed by a merchant, because of the essentially civil
nature of such acts. The duty of a merchant of furnishing support for his descendants,
or his obligation of accounting and of paying the balance due if he has been the guardian
of a minor, are essentially civil and alien to commercial law. What criterion should be
followed with illicit acts (hechos iicitos)? A merchant, like any other person, may com-
mit delicts and quasi-delicts. Case law and doctrine agree that if a merchant commits an
illicit act, the act itself should be considered commercial provided it has certain relation-
ship to his commerce; this doctrinal principle has been accepted by the Code of Com-
merce in art. 1074, § 9 (it corresponds to the present Cod. Com. art. 1090, § 9). In other
words, if a merchant commits an illicit act, it is indispensable to find out whether the
merchant was acting within the scope of his trade or profession, or, on the other hand,
as a common individual, in order to determine if the action to recover damages is com-
mercial or civil. A few instances will clarify the matter: if a merchant is guilty of un-
fair competition or if he forges a signature, or if the seller of foods altered them caus-
ing damages to the health of his customers, or if a banker issues a false draft, it is be-
yond doubt that these cases and others of a similar nature can be tried before the com-
mercial courts (jurisdicci6n comercial) because of the relationships of such actions with
the commercial activities of the wrongdoers. On the other hand, the acts of a merchant
who is guilty of homicide, or of seduction, or of libel or slander, assuming that these
acts are not related in any manner whatsoever with the commercial or professional activi-
.ties of the merchant, and that they are executed while he was acting as a common indi-
vidual, are civil in character and subject to the jurisdiction of civil courts (jursdiccl6n
civil). A similar conclusion, with regard to illegal acts has been reached in France and
Argentina, although there is a split of opinion in those countries. (See 2 Siburu, op. cit.
supra note 24, at 55-59, and I Fernandez, op. cit. supra note 33, at 46, for an abridged state-
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final subjective test is to presume that acts performed by merchants are
commercial, unless sufficient contrary evidence is furnished.102-
ment of case law and doctrine in both countries.) On this matter, see the article by Bolaffio,
Degli atti di commerdo accessori 1 RMD. Co. 1 (1909). With regard to Brazilian law, in mat-
ters of quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts, their commercial nature is recognized when
they are ancillary or incident to the exercise of the mercantile profession, see 1 Martins
Ferreira, supra note 55, at 102.
102. Argentina, Cod. Com. art. 5; Colombia, Cod. Com. art. 21; Mfexico, Cod. Com.
art. 15, § XX; Paraguay, Cod. Com. art. 5; Uruguay, Cod. Com. art. 5.
